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Abstract
The bene￿ts and costs of di⁄erent forms of job design have been analyzed
in the literature yet. The focus has thereby mostly been on job designs under
formal contracts between the parties. However, in the real world relational
contracts - informal agreements sustained by the value of future relationships
- play a role as important as formal ones. This paper therefore considers the
advantages and disadvantages of two di⁄erent kinds of job design, partial del-
egation and complete delegation with specialization, when the parties make
use of both, formal and informal agreements. It is found that many of the
results derived in the absence of informal contracts will no longer hold, if
these contracts become available.
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11 Introduction
In each multi-person organization, tasks have to be divided between the orga-
nization￿ s members. Speci￿cally, the manager of the organization (henceforth
called the principal) has to decide about which tasks to handle himself and
which tasks to delegate to his subordinates (henceforth called the agents).
In other words, the principal has to install an appropriate job design (i.e. a
grouping of tasks into jobs). This decision is essential for the organization￿ s
success in the market. A ￿rm with an ine¢ cient internal organization is
likely to produce at higher costs than its better organized competitors and
so faces an important comparative disadvantage.1
Besides the obvious reason that a principal is usually time-constrained
and thus cannot handle all tasks himself, the economic literature gives two
main reasons for delegation of a task. The ￿rst reason is based on the as-
sumption that an agent is more appropriate for a certain task, either because
1In order to see, what consequences an ine¢ cient internal organization might have, con-
sider the Deutsche Telekom AG, Germany￿ s biggest telecommunications company. Until
2004, the company was subdivided into four divisions, T-Online (responsible for Internet
services), T-Mobile (mobile telecommunications services), T-Systems (Information Tech-
nology), and T-Com (￿xed network). This structure proved to be very problematic. The
single divisions acted in an uncoordinated way and partly spent resources to alienate cus-
tomers from each other. Telekom￿ s CEO Kai-Uwe Ricke ￿nally realized that Telekom
was ine¢ ciently organized and restructured the company. Presently, it consists of three
divisions, one responsible for business customers, the second covering the market for mo-
bile telecommunications services, and the third dealing with broadband and ￿xed network
services.
2he is in possession of relevant information that cannot be easily transferred
or because he has important abilities the principal has not. The second rea-
son builds on incentive considerations. Aghion & Tirole (1997) e.g. argue
that delegation of formal responsibility leads to increased initiative at lower
layers of a hierarchy. If formal responsibility is delegated to an agent, the
principal commits not to overrule the agent, yielding higher incentives for the
agent. On the other hand, delegation of a task and hence of responsibility
may also entail incentive problems, as the agent is likely to pursue di⁄erent
goals than the ￿rm. These incentive problems might outbalance the bene￿ts
from delegation. Concentrating on delegation as a means to ensure an e¢ -
cient use of decentralized information, Melumad & Reichelstein (1987) and
Melumad et al. (1995, 1997) extensively deal with these incentive problems.
Making use of di⁄erent revelation mechanisms, they demonstrate under what
circumstances the problems may or may not be eliminated.
Further, in a model, where only aggregate output on several tasks is mea-
surable, Itoh (1994, 2001) analyzes di⁄erent modes of delegation. Assuming
that the principal is exogenously forced to delegate at least one task, Itoh
found that three e⁄ects mainly in￿ uenced the optimal allocation of tasks.
With risk-averse agents, the principal seeks to do some task himself or to
assign all tasks to a single agent in order to save on risk premiums. However,
assigning all tasks to a single agent might lead to an overload of that agent
and, hence, to high e⁄ort costs the agent must be compensated for. Finally,
if the principal decides to handle some task himself, there will arise some
kind of free-rider problem that cannot be eliminated by means of incentive
3pay.
While Itoh mentioned important aspects of the job design decision, his
analysis is incomplete in that the principal solely relies on formal incentive
contracts to motivate the agents. In many ￿rms, however, incentives are
not solely provided via formal contracts, but also via long-lasting relational
agreements.2 Employees are often paid contingent on contractible measures
(such as sales volume), but also on subjective assessments that are not veri￿-
able by a third party. An example is Nokia, the world￿ s leading mobile phone
supplier. While Nokia makes extensive use of formal incentives (e.g. pay-
ments based on project/program-success), every year, there is one subjective
performance evaluation of all employees. Based on this evaluation, wages
are increased or not.3 Hence, an important question is how (or whether) the
appropriateness of a job design will change, if incentives are provided by a
combination of formal and relational contracts.
This question is tried to be answered in the current paper. I therefore
combine the model of Itoh (1994) with a model of Baker et al. (1994). Baker
et al. consider a principal-agent relationship, where the principal remuner-
ates the agent contingent on both, the realizations of contractible and non-
contractible performance measures. The authors particularly focus on the
interaction of these forms of compensation.4 This paper applies the Baker
2Relational contracts are also referred to as informal, implicit or self-enforcing contracts.
Throughout the paper, I use relational contracts and informal contracts as synonyms.
3For further examples see Gibbons (2005), who reports on several other ￿rms tying
their employees￿compensations to subjective performance measures.
4Other papers analyzing the interaction of formal and relational contracts include
4et al. model to situations, in which two tasks have to be dealt with and the
principal is not able to handle all the tasks himself.
Two kinds of job design, partial delegation (one task is handled by the
principal and one task by an agent) and complete delegation with special-
ization (each task is dealt with by a di⁄erent agent), are compared in the
absence as well as in the presence of relational agreements.5 Formal con-
tracts are based on an imperfect measure of joint contribution to ￿rm value
on the two tasks. In the absence of relational contracts, the job design de-
cision is then determined by a trade-o⁄ of two countervailing e⁄ects. Due
to the imperfection of the measure, the agents￿e⁄orts are usually distorted
with respect to desired e⁄ort. This e⁄ect is more distinctive under complete
delegation with specialization, since, in this case, two agents instead of one
are involved in the production process. On the other hand, as compensation
is based on a measure of joint performance, a free-rider problem is present.
While this problem can be e⁄ectively mitigated under complete delegation
with specialization by means of incentive pay, under partial delegation, it
cannot. Assuming that the performance measure is positively correlated
to total contribution to ￿rm value, providing the agent with higher incen-
tives automatically yields lower incentives for the principal (and vice versa).
Schmidt and Schnitzer (1995), Pearce and Stacchetti (1998), Che and Yoo (2001), Poppo
and Zenger (2002), Rayo (2002), or Itoh and Morita (2004).
5Itoh considered a third job design, namely complete delegation without specialization,
where a single agent handles both tasks. However, in this paper this job design is always
dominated by complete delegation with specialization. The reason is that Itoh considered
risk-averse agents, whereas the current paper deals with risk-neutral ones.
5Considering both e⁄ects, a simple, intuitive condition is derived: Partial del-
egation will be optimal, if and only if the distortion in an agent￿ s e⁄ort is
relatively high.
It is further assumed that an agent￿ s true contribution to ￿rm value is
observable (but not contractible). Hence, in a model with in￿nitely repeated
interaction, relational agreements may become feasible. The principal may
pay an agent a bonus based on the realization of his true contribution to
￿rm value. If the principal could choose the bonus arbitrarily, the ￿rst-
best could be achieved. However, the principal is tempted to renege on
the bonus and this temptation increases in the bonus size. Hence, he may
credibly commit not to renege on the bonus, only if this bonus is rather low
so that ￿rst-best e⁄orts are not achieved. The quality of a certain job design
therefore mainly depends on three factors. First, it depends on the size of
the respective relational bonus that can be sustained. Second, it depends
on the job designs￿relative needs for relational bonuses, i.e., the relative
pro￿t increase after a replacement of formal by relational contracts. Third,
it depends on the respective status quo points, that is, the pro￿ts that can
be achieved in the absence of relational agreements. The interplay of these
three arguments decides about the optimality of a job design. It is found
that the introduction of relational agreements has a crucial in￿ uence on the
model results. A job design being optimal under formal contracts is likely
to be relatively worse when relational contracts are available. The reason is
that relational contracts may be extremely e⁄ective especially in situations
where formal contracts are not. A job design￿ s weakness in providing good
6formal incentives may become its strength under relational agreements.
There additionally exists a recent, complementary paper by Sch￿ttner
(2004). She also discusses the bene￿ts and costs of several kinds of job
design under interplay of formal and relational contracts. Whereas this paper
mainly treats the question of whether or not to delegate a task, Sch￿ttner, in
a slightly di⁄erent setting, focuses on several forms of complete delegation.
That is, in her paper, the decision to delegate all tasks is exogenously given,
and then the best form of complete delegation is derived.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the optimal job
design in the absence of relational agreements, while section 3 extends the
analysis to a combined use of formal and relational contracts. Section 4
contains a discussion of several model assumptions and section 5 concludes.
2 Job design in the absence of relational con-
tracts
As mentioned before, the current model combines the models of Itoh (1994)
and Baker et al. (1994). Consider a principal and two identical agents, all
assumed to be risk-neutral. In the organization, two tasks have to be dealt
with, tasks a and b. Because of e.g. time restrictions the principal is able
to handle at most one task, whereas an agent may handle both tasks.6 The
6The model also (and perhaps better) refers to a situation, where more than two tasks
have to be handled, but only two tasks may be delegated by the principal. Since he has
to handle all remaining tasks, the principal has to delegate at least one task.
7principal can therefore decide to assign either both tasks to a single agent
(complete delegation without specialization), task a to one agent and task
b to another (complete delegation with specialization), or to delegate one
task and handle the remaining task himself (partial delegation).7 With risk-
neutral agents and tasks being substitutes, it can be shown that complete
delegation without specialization is always dominated by complete delegation
with specialization.8 The paper therefore focuses on a comparison of com-
plete delegation with specialization (henceforth CDS) and partial delegation
(henceforth PD).
The person in charge of task i = a;b exerts unobservable e⁄ort ei ￿ 0
that stochastically determines an observable, but unveri￿able output yi.9
This output measures contribution to ￿rm value on task i and equals ei-
ther one or zero. Let the probability that output equals one be given by
Probfyi = 1jeig = minfei;1g. Total output is given by y = ya + yb.
7It is implicitly assumed that task sharing is impossible. One reason for this assumption
could be that each task requires the use of a machine that cannot be operated by two people
at the same time.
8The proof of this statement is available from the author upon request.
9As pointed out by Malcomson (1984), a rank-order tournament between the agents
could be arranged, even if output is unveri￿able by a third party. With the assumptions
made in this paper (in particular, risk neutrality and unlimited liability of the agents)
such a tournament would always yield a ￿rst-best solution, in the static as well as in the
dynamic case. However, a tournament scheme may also lead to serious problems such as
collusion between the agents (see e.g. Dye (1984)) or sabotage (see e.g. Lazear (1989),
Konrad (2000) or Chen (2003)). Throughout the paper it is assumed that these problems
are so severe that the tournament scheme is never desired.
8E⁄orts ea and eb additionally a⁄ect a second performance measure p that
is contractible and therefore may be the basis of an enforceable contract. p is
an imperfect measure of joint contribution to ￿rm value on the two tasks and
also equals either one or zero. The probability of a measure realization of
one is given by Probfp = 1jea;ebg = minf￿aea + ￿beb;1g. The realization of
each parameter ￿i is unknown, when the principal determines the job design
and when the agents are o⁄ered a wage contract. Thereafter, it is revealed
to the respective person in charge, that is, the person in charge for task a (b)
privately learns the realization of ￿a (￿b). The parameter ￿i characterizes the
actual di⁄erence between the e⁄ect of ei on y and its e⁄ect on p. Following
Baker et al. ￿i can be interpreted as follows: There are days (i.e., values of
￿i), where high e⁄ort spent on task i leads to similar increases in y and p
(￿i around one), days, where high e⁄ort increases y but not p (￿i near zero)
and days, where small e⁄ort increases p but not y (￿i much larger than one).
It is further assumed that the mean of ￿i equals one so that, in expectation,
the measure p is an unbiased measure of total output y. This assumption
allows to characterize the expected di⁄erence of p from y by a single measure,




￿ 1. The parameters ￿a and ￿b
are independently, identically distributed (i.i.d. assumption), i.e., V ar[￿a] =
V ar[￿b] =: V ar[￿]. Their distribution is common knowledge.
E⁄ort entails costs, which, to derive several closed-form solutions, are as-
sumed to be quadratic and given by C (ei) = c
2 (ei)
2, with c > 0. Throughout
the paper, it is assumed that the parameter c and the support of ￿i are such
that, in equilibrium, ei < 1 and ￿aea + ￿beb < 1. Since under CDS as well
9as under PD, no person handles both tasks, the formula of e⁄ort costs does
not show a term indicating the degree of cost substitutability between the
two tasks.10 Finally, each agent is supposed to have an outside option that
leads to an expected utility of ￿ U. I assume that ￿ U = 0. This assumption is
relaxed in section 4.
The timing of the model is as follows: At stage 1, the principal determines
a job design. At stage 2, he o⁄ers a wage contract to one or two agents,
respectively. At stage 3, the agent(s) accept(s) or reject(s) the o⁄er. An
agent rejecting the o⁄er as well as an agent not being o⁄ered a wage contract
realizes his outside option. If all wage o⁄ers are rejected, the principal handles
one task himself, whereas the other task is not handled at all. At stage 4,
the person in charge of task i learns the realization of ￿i, while e⁄orts are
chosen at stage 5. At stage 6, p and y are realized and payments are made.
Before the model is solved, consider the ￿rst-best solution, in which e⁄orts
are contractible. In the ￿rst-best solution, the principal could hire two agents










Let us now solve the model. As in this section a one-period model is
considered, relational contracts are not feasible and the principal solely relies














10This is the case under complete delegation without specialization in Itoh (1994). Under
that job design, costs, entailed by e⁄ort on a task, are likely to increase in the e⁄ort
level on the other task. It is this cost substitutability between the tasks that causes the
inexpediency of complete delegation without specialization.
10the f should indicate the isolated consideration of formal contracts. While
the agents always receive a ￿xed wage of ￿oi, they will receive the variable
component ￿1i; only if the joint performance measure p equals one.
The model is solved by backward induction. I start with the CDS case.
After observing the realization of ￿a, the agent working on task a chooses
his e⁄ort to maximize expected utility. This expected utility is given by (1).
















E￿i [￿] denotes the expectation operator with respect to ￿i and ep stands for
ex post, since (1) denotes the expected utility after observing the parameter
￿a.




c . Similarly, the agent working




c . The agents￿ex ante expected utilities,



































































1b such that his expected pro￿t is maximized, while the ￿xed
11wages are set such that the agents￿participation constraints are binding. The











































The principal￿ s expected pro￿t is given by E￿CDS;f = 1
cE[￿2].
The optimal formal contract under PD can be derived analogously. Sup-
pose in this case, without loss of generality, that the principal delegates
the second task and handles the ￿rst task himself. The principal￿ s and the








c . The opti-
mal incentive parameter satis￿es ￿
PD;f
1b = 1








A comparison of E￿CDS;f and E￿PD;f immediately yields the following
proposition:
Proposition 1 The principal chooses CDS (PD, is indi⁄erent between both
job designs) if and only if E [￿2] < (>;=)1:5.
Let me explain the intuition behind proposition 1. Compared to CDS,
PD exhibits one important advantage and one important disadvantage. The
disadvantage stems from the free-rider problem. Under both kinds of job
design, the agents are compensated contingent on the realization of some ag-
gregate performance measure. Hence, they receive only part of their marginal
12product, whereas they bear the complete e⁄ort costs. As a consequence, they
decide to choose ine¢ ciently low e⁄orts. This free-rider problem can be mit-
igated e⁄ectively under CDS by installing high-powered incentives, i.e., by
increasing both variable components. Under PD, on the other hand, provid-
ing the principal and the agent with high-powered incentives is impossible.
The joint performance measure is positively correlated to total output. Thus,
if the principal provides the agent with high incentives, he will automatically
decrease his marginal payo⁄ from exerting e⁄ort. That is, installing high
incentives for the agent leads to low incentives for the principal and vice
versa.11 As a consequence, under PD the free-rider problem is still present.
However, as seen in proposition 1, PD may also be the preferred choice of
job design. There exists a second negative e⁄ect that is less severe under PD
than under CDS. As mentioned before, the measure p is only an imperfect
measure of total contribution to ￿rm value. Due to this imperfection, an
agent￿ s behavior shows distortions with respect to desired behavior. This
distortion depends on the realization of ￿i. For ￿i < 1, the agent responsible
for task i exerts undesirably low e⁄ort. On the contrary, for ￿i > 1, the actual
e⁄ort is undesirably high. Since the principal must compensate the agents
for their e⁄ort costs such distortions from desired e⁄ort are costly. Under
PD, this distorting behavior is clearly less serious. There is only one agent
behaving ine¢ ciently. The principal focuses on the realization of output and
11As shown by Holmstr￿m (1982), the free-rider problem might be solved by introduc-
ing a third party being able to ￿break the budget￿ . Since such a solution entails new
complications (see e.g. Eswaran and Kotwal (1984)) it is not considered in this paper.
13therefore chooses a more desired e⁄ort.
The cut-o⁄ in proposition 1 is a result of the interaction of these two
e⁄ects. As is clear from the preceding argumentation, PD will be preferable,
if the distortion in an agent￿ s e⁄ort with respect to the desired e⁄ort is very
high. Since, in expectation, p is an unbiased measure of y, the agents￿e⁄orts
will be highly distorted if V ar[￿] is high. This variance can be rewritten as
V ar[￿] = E [￿2] ￿ 1. Hence, this variance as well as the relative advantage
of PD compared to CDS is strictly increasing in E [￿2]. Consequently, there
exists a cut-o⁄ value for E [￿2], where the optimal job design changes.
3 Job design when formal and relational con-
tracts interact
In the one-period model in section 2, no relational agreement could be sus-
tained, since every such agreement would be reneged on. In order to analyze
the interaction of formal and relational contracts, I therefore consider an
in￿nitely repeated version of the model from section 2.
In this in￿nite horizon model, some additional assumptions have to be
introduced. First, it is assumed that the principal, besides the wage pay-
ment speci￿ed in section 2, o⁄ers an agent a bonus payment contingent on
the agent￿ s contribution to ￿rm value. As in Baker et al. (1994), to avoid
complications by creating a temptation for the agents to break the implicit
contract, the relational bonus is assumed to be non-negative. This assump-
tion should be ful￿lled in most real world settings.
14The principal discounts future pro￿ts. The discount rate is r, i.e., a one-
unit pro￿t in the next period is worth 1
1+r units in the present one. The
discount rate r could, for example, represent the interest rate, to which the
principal could lend or borrow money. The agents are assumed to discount
future utility at a rate ra, which may or may not di⁄er from r. The purpose
of this discount rate is simply to appropriately de￿ne the in￿nitely repeated
game. It does not a⁄ect the model results, as the following argumentation
will show. In the model, discounting solely a⁄ects a party￿ s temptation to
renege on a relational contract. However, as discussed before, an agent is not
interested in refusing the payment of a relational bonus, since the bonus ac-
crues to him. Moreover, he could breach the relational contract by deviating
from the agreed e⁄ort. As this e⁄ort is expected utility maximizing, such a
deviation is also not desirable for the agent.
All players, i.e., the principal and the agents, are assumed to follow a
modi￿ed grim trigger strategy. Roughly speaking, they start by cooperating
(that is, by honoring the relational agreement) and continue cooperation un-
less one player defects, in which case they refuse to cooperate forever after.
Referred to the model this means that, after the informal agreement was
reneged on once, no player will ever honor some informal contract and the
parties will rely on the formal contracts derived in section 2.12 Moreover, un-
12Two remarks are necessary: First, in the literature on in￿nite games, it is sometimes
argued that the game remaining after one party defects coincides with the game as a whole.
As a consequence, equilibria being available in the game as a whole should also be available
after the relational agreement was broken. Hence, the parties should be able to renegotiate
from punishment to a di⁄erent equilibrium with higher payo⁄s. I abstract from this
15der CDS, these strategies imply that if the principal reneges on the relational
bonus of only one agent, both agents lose trust in the principal.
Finally, suppose that the change from a certain job design to another
entails considerable ￿x costs, so that the principal always maintains the job
design he initially has chosen. This assumption has implications for pay-
ments o⁄the equilibrium path. It ensures that, in case the principal reneges
on the relational contract, that is, when relational contracts are no longer
available, he does not change the job design. Although mainly made to sim-
plify calculations, this assumption seems to map practice very well, for ￿rms
seem to change their organizational structure very rarely. The assumption is
cancelled in section 4.
In order to derive the optimal combination of formal and relational con-
tracts, I search for a subgame perfect equilibrium of the game. I consider
only stationary contracts, under which the principal in every period o⁄ers
the same wage contract and the agents choose the same e⁄orts on the equi-
librium path. This is, as shown by Levin (2003), without loss of generality.
possibility by assuming that renegotiation costs are too high, either because renegotiation
causes too high monetary costs or because it simply takes too long. In the latter case,
renegotiation would prevent the parties from working on their tasks so that renegotiation
gains would be outweighed by the loss in production. Second, Abreu (1988) showed that
highest equilibrium payo⁄s are supported by the strongest credible punishments. However,
in the current model, grim trigger strategies may not yield strongest credible punishment
(i.e. the grim trigger strategies may not form an optimal penal code). Again, it could be
argued that the elaboration of an optimal penal code would be too costly so that relying
on the (relatively simple) grim trigger strategies is preferred.







1i p + ￿
CDS;r






1i p + ￿
PD;r
i yi,
where r indicates the combined use of formal and relational contracts. The
term ￿iyi corresponds to an informal promise of the principal to pay the agent
a bonus depending on the realization of unveri￿able output.13 Since such an
informal promise cannot be enforced by a court, it must be self-enforcing.
Consider ￿rst the CDS case. The incentives provided by a relational
contract depend on whether or not the agents believe that the principal will
honor the contract. If, in a given period, they trust the principal, the agents
will choose their e⁄orts, after observing ￿i, to maximize expected ex post


















































13One could also assume that the wage payment contains a further element ￿iyj, where
￿i is a payment the agent will receive, if the contribution of the person in charge for the
other task equals one. With the restriction ￿i ￿ 0, the principal will always set ￿i equal
to zero. The element ￿iyj is therefore not considered in the wage contract.













































































The principal again determines the ￿xed wages such that the agents￿partic-





























































Note that the principal will honor the relational contract, only if the dis-
counted additional future pro￿ts arising from the combined use of formal
and relational agreements exceed the present gain from not paying the two









It can easily be seen that this constraint is more likely to be satis￿ed, the
higher the additional pro￿t from relying on relational agreements, the lower
the discount rate r, and the lower the relational bonus to be paid. This is
intuitive. If the principal does gain very much from the use of relational
18contracts and if he is rather patient (that is, future pro￿ts are hardly dis-
counted), the bene￿t from not paying the relational bonuses will probably be
outweighed by the loss in future pro￿ts. On the other hand, the gain from
not paying the bonus and, hence, the reneging temptation certainly increases
in the size of the bonuses.









b , the principal maximizes E￿CDS;r
subject to the non-reneging constraint. Using the i.i.d. assumption, the






























































































































￿ ￿r = 0 (15)
These conditions lead to a symmetric solution, the principal chooses same

































￿ ￿r = 0 (17)
If, in the optimum, the non-reneging constraint is non-binding (i.e. ￿ = 0),
the solution is ￿
CDS;r
1 = 0 and ￿
CDS;r = 1. That is, if the principal is
su¢ ciently patient, a ￿rst-best relational contract will be installed. Each
agent bases his e⁄ort decision solely on the realization of output and, as a
consequence, no distorting behavior will arise.
Of more interest is the case, in which the principal is less patient so
that the non-reneging constraint binds in the optimum. From (16) and the
binding condition (10), the second-best relational bonus and the second-best
expected pro￿t can be derived. The possible values of relational bonus and
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The derivation of the optimal combination of formal and relational con-
tract in the PD case is analogous. The optimal relational bonus in this case
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2cE[￿2] .
Let us now compare the expected pro￿ts to see, which kind of job design
the principal prefers. When comparing the pro￿ts, it is convenient to distin-
guish between the cases E [￿2] < 1:5, E [￿2] > 1:5 and E [￿2] = 1:5. I start
with the ￿rst one.
As shown in proposition 1, CDS is optimal in the absence of relational
agreements. With E [￿2] < 1:5, conditions ^ rc < ~ rc < ^ rp < ~ rp hold. Proposi-
tion 2 shows the principal￿ s optimal job design in this case.
Proposition 2 Suppose that E [￿2] < 1:5. (i) For r ￿ ^ rc, both job designs
lead to the ￿rst-best solution. The principal is in this case indi⁄erent between
the two job designs. (ii) For ^ rc < r ￿ ^ rp, PD yields the ￿rst-best solution,
whereas CDS does not. PD is thus preferred. (iii) For ^ rp < r ￿ ~ rp, there
exists a cut-o⁄ ￿ r with ^ rp < ￿ r < ~ rp such that PD is preferred only if r 2 [^ rp; ￿ r].
(iv) For r > ~ rp, CDS is preferred.
Proof: See Appendix.
21Note ￿rst that r > ~ rp corresponds to the case, where the principal is so
impatient or the interest rate is so high that any informal contract would be
reneged on. Put di⁄erently, in this case only formal contracts are available.
As should be clear, the model analyzed in section 2 is only a special case of
the interaction of formal and relational contracts. Of great interest is the
result that the optimal job design if only formal contracts are available need
no longer be optimal when the principal uses some combination of formal and
relational contract to compensate his agents. On the contrary, when formal
and relational contracts interact, this job design is often the less preferred
one. In other words, the results derived in the less general model in section
2 are not robust to an introduction of relational agreements.
Let me explain this result in more detail. The principal would always
prefer to rely on informal contracts rather than on formal contracts, since,
in this way, distortions in the agents￿e⁄orts are mitigated. However, as
condition (10) indicates, the principal may be unable to commit not to renege
on relational bonuses so high that the ￿rst-best solution would be achieved.
He therefore uses some combination of formal and relational contracts as
incentive device. The appropriateness of a job design in this case roughly
depends on three factors. First, it depends on the job designs￿needs for
relational agreements, i.e., the relative pro￿t increase under each job design
when formal incentives are replaced by relational ones. Second, it depends
on the relative size of the relational bonuses that can be sustained under each
job design. Third, it depends on the respective status quo point, that is the
respective pro￿ts, if relying solely on formal contracts. While the third point
22has already been treated in section 2, in this section, the ￿rst two points are
analyzed.
I start with the ￿rst one. When comparing the principal￿ s bene￿t from
the introduction of a relational contract with a ￿xed bonus under PD and
under CDS, there are two countervailing e⁄ects. On the one hand, a rela-
tional contract seems to be more bene￿cial under PD. From (16), we see that
formal and relational incentives are substitutes. That is, the introduction of
relational contracts leads to lower remuneration based on the realization of
the contractible measure p. Under PD, this e⁄ect mitigates the free-rider
problem, since, as explained in section 2, lower formal incentives for the
agent yield higher incentives for the principal. This advantage is absent un-
der CDS. CDS, on the other hand, especially bene￿ts from the introduction
of relational agreements since, under that job design, distortions in e⁄ort
behavior of two agents are mitigated.
Is any of these e⁄ects dominant? In order to answer this question, it
is convenient to calculate, for a ￿xed relational bonus ￿, the di⁄erence
between pro￿t in the presence and absence of relational agreements un-
der each job design. Denote by ￿CDS and ￿PD these di⁄erences. Using
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. It is then straightfor-
ward to show that ￿CDS > ￿PD () E [￿2] > 1:5. The condition says that
the job design performing relatively worse in the absence of relational con-
tracts bene￿ts more strongly from their introduction. In case E [￿2] < 1:5
23this means that the ￿rst e⁄ect is dominant, i.e., under PD, the principal
bene￿ts more strongly from the introduction of relational agreements.
Let us now analyze, under which job design higher relational bonuses can
be sustained. The possibility to remunerate an agent with a certain relational
bonus depends on the level of the bonus, the number of bonuses to be paid,
the di⁄erence in pro￿t in the presence and absence of relational contracts,
and the discount rate. Hence, the comparison of the two job designs with
respect to the maximum relational bonus they may implement depends on
the respective di⁄erence in pro￿ts when relational contracts are honored and
when they are not as well as on the number of bonuses to be paid. Recall
that for E [￿2] < 1:5, ￿PD > ￿CDS. This should lead to the implementation
of higher relational bonuses under PD, since, under that job design, the
principal is more heavily punished for reneging on the relational contract.
Moreover, under PD, a higher relational bonus should be sustained since this
bonus has to be paid only for one agent and not for two as under CDS.
On account of this, the principal￿ s bene￿t from reneging on the relational
contract should be lower under PD.
Since these e⁄ects are enforcing, PD should always lead to higher rela-
tional bonuses than CDS. This can be con￿rmed comparing (18) and (20).
Not only is the second-best relational bonus higher, but there are also pa-
rameter constellations, where the ￿rst-best bonus can only be implemented
under PD. Similarly, there are parameter constellations, for which no rela-
tional contract is feasible under CDS, whereas there are relational agreements
under PD. Further, since ~ rc < ~ rp, there exists no range of parameter values,
24where, under both kinds of job design, there is a combined use of formal and
relational contracts.
As a consequence, PD allows a much wider use of relational contracts than
CDS. It is therefore preferred for many values of the discount parameter r.
Since CDS is optimal in the absence of relational agreements, there exists
a clear cut-o⁄ ￿ r, where the optimal job design changes. For r < ￿ r, the
principal under PD makes extensive use of informal agreements, whereas
formal contracts are of major importance under CDS. Hence, for r < ￿ r, PD
is optimal. For r > ￿ r, under both job designs relational agreements are
rather unimportant. In this case, CDS is preferred since it is very e⁄ective
in mitigating the free-rider problem and su⁄ers only little from distortion in
e⁄orts.
It is worth emphasizing the relation between a job design￿ s appropriate-
ness under formal contracts and its suitability under a combined use of formal
and relational contracts. This relation is namely very helpful in explaining
the arising discrepancy between the optimal job design in the absence and
presence of relational agreements. Loosely speaking, a job design performing
poorly in the absence of relational contracts is likely to do (relatively) better
in their presence. Let me explain this in more detail. A job design performing
poorly in the absence of relational agreements may sustain a relatively high
relational bonus, as the principal￿ s punishment in case of reneging on the re-
lational contract is relatively high. The principal is therefore less tempted to
renege on the relational agreement. Similarly, as mentioned before, a poorly
performing job design bene￿ts relatively more from the introduction of re-
25lational agreements, as there are more ine¢ cient actions to be mitigated by
relational contracts. To summarize, a job design￿ s weaknesses in the absence
of relational agreements may become its strengths under a combined use of
formal and relational contracts.
Consider now the case E [￿2] > 1:5. In this case, conditions ^ rc < ^ rp <
~ rc < ~ rp hold. Proposition 3 describes the principal￿ s optimal choice.
Proposition 3 Suppose that E [￿2] > 1:5. (i) For r ￿ ^ rc, both job designs
lead to the ￿rst-best solution. The principal is in this case indi⁄erent between
the two job designs. (ii) For r > ^ rc, PD is always preferred.
Proof: See Appendix.
The e⁄ects at work in this setting are the same as for E [￿2] < 1:5. On the
one hand, the relational bonus to be sustained as well as the status quo point
is higher under PD. Under CDS, on the other hand, the principal bene￿ts
relatively more from the introduction of relational contracts. As the ￿rst two
e⁄ects always outweigh the third, for all values of the discount rate r, PD is
(weakly) preferred.
Finally, suppose that E [￿2] = 1:5. In this case, we have ^ rc < ^ rp = ~ rc < ~ rp.
Again, the same e⁄ects as in the ￿rst two cases determine the optimal job
design. In proposition 4, I therefore only present the optimal job design,
without further explaining the intuition behind the results.
Proposition 4 With E [￿2] = 1:5, the following results hold: (i) For r ￿ ^ rc,
both job designs lead to the ￿rst-best solution. The principal is in this case
indi⁄erent between the two job designs. (ii) For ^ rc < r < ~ rp, PD is always
26preferred. (iii) For r ￿ ~ rp, the principal is indi⁄erent between the two job
designs.
Proof: Obvious and omitted.
4 Discussion
Up to this point, two assumptions were made facilitating the analysis, namely
that a change in organizational structure entails considerable ￿xed costs and
that the agents￿reservation utilities equal zero. I now relax these assump-
tions. Since the model becomes extremely complicated once the assumptions
are cancelled, I only discuss the e⁄ects that such a cancellation entails. I
begin with the assumption concerning the ￿xed costs.
If a change in job design is totally costless, the principal will, after reneg-
ing on the relational contract, always switch to that job design being optimal
in the absence of relational agreements. Hence, for E [￿2] > 1:5(E [￿2] < 1:5),
he will choose PD (CDS). This may lead to a higher pro￿t o⁄ the equilib-
rium path. To be concrete, for E [￿2] > 1:5(E [￿2] < 1:5), the principal￿ s
CDS (PD) pro￿t in the absence of relational contracts increases, whereas
the PD (CDS) pro￿t does not change. This change in pro￿t has impacts on
the non-reneging constraint. A ceteris paribus increase in pro￿t, when the
principal solely relies on formal contracts, yields a (weakly) lower relational
bonus that can be sustained. Hence, compared to the results in proposition
2, CDS should become more preferable since the relational bonus being sus-
tained under PD decreases. Similarly, compared to the results in proposition
273, PD should become even more dominant.
Although it is with some related implications, the introduction of a reser-
vation utility di⁄erent from zero entails more complex e⁄ects. First, PD
should always become more preferable, since, under PD, only one agent has
to be compensated for ￿ U. In order to determine the implications on the re-
lational bonus to be sustained and the pro￿ts under relational agreements,
it is convenient to make some case distinction. In the ￿rst case, the reserva-
tion utility is rather small. In particular, it is so small that, under both job
designs, the pro￿t that can be realized in the absence of relational contracts
remains positive. In this case, the model results with respect to the rela-
tional bonus do not change at all. With positive reservation utilities both,
the pro￿t, when formal and relational contracts interact as well as the pro￿t
when the principal solely relies on formal contracts, are decreased by the same
amount. The bonus that can be sustained therefore does not change. In the
second case, the reservation utilities adopt intermediate values so that, in the
absence of relational agreements, one job design leads to a positive pro￿t and
the other one to zero pro￿t.14 An increase in reservation utility then a⁄ects
only three and not four pro￿ts. While it decreases all positive pro￿ts, the
zero pro￿t is una⁄ected. As a consequence, the bonus under the job design,
where both pro￿ts are positive does not change. On the contrary, the bonus
under the other job design (weakly) decreases. Hence, the ￿rst job design
should (relatively) become more desirable. In case three, the reservation util-
14It is assumed that the ￿rm would close down before it made negative pro￿t. Therefore,
the worst possible outcome for the principal is a pro￿t of zero.
28ities are so high that both job designs lead to zero pro￿ts in the absence of
relational contracts. An increase in reservation utility then a⁄ects both job
designs, since the relational bonus (weakly) decreases under PD as well as
under CDS. However, the absolute change in bonus and its impact on the
pro￿t may be di⁄erent.
5 Concluding Remarks
This paper started by comparing two di⁄erent job designs in a static envi-
ronment. A very nice and intuitive condition was derived indicating when
each job design is optimal, respectively. Thereafter, a model with in￿nite
horizon was considered. The purpose was to allow the principal to use both,
formal and informal contracts, as incentive device. It was shown that the
introduction of relational contracts has a crucial impact on a job design￿ s
appropriateness. Particularly, a job design being optimal in the absence of
relational contracts need no longer be optimal, if these contracts are available.
The reason is that a job design performing very poorly in the absence of
relational agreements allows the principal to install high-powered informal
incentives, since his punishment from defecting is very high. Moreover, the
principal bene￿ts from the introduction of relational contracts more strongly
in settings, where relying solely on formal contracts is not very pro￿table.
The interplay of these two e⁄ects may overturn the results derived in the
absence of relational agreements.
This observation is particularly very interesting, since most economic
29models are static ones. As seen in this paper, the results derived in sta-
tic scenarios need to be handled with care. It should thus be of great interest
how the introduction of dynamic and, hence, of informal agreements a⁄ects
other model results. Future research should deal with this question.
Appendix
Proof of proposition 2:
The proof of parts (i), (ii) and (iv) is obvious and therefore omitted.
It remains to prove part (iii). For ^ rp < r ￿ ~ rp, PD leads to a mix-
ture of formal and relational contracts, whereas under CDS only formal




4E[￿2](2E[￿2]￿1)c and E￿CDS;r = 1
cE[￿2]. PD is the pre-
ferred choice of job design if the following condition holds: 4(E [￿2])
2 ￿ 1 +
8rcE [￿2]((2E [￿2] ￿ 1) ￿ 2rcE [￿2]) > 8E [￿2]￿4. Simplifying yields z(r) :=
4(E [￿2] ￿ 1)
2￿1+16rc(E [￿2])
2￿8rcE [￿2]￿16r2c2 (E [￿2])
2 > 0. The deriv-
ative of z with respect to r will be positive, only if 2E [￿2]￿1￿4rcE [￿2] > 0.
For r = ^ rp, the left-hand-side of the inequality is zero. Consequently, it as
well as the derivative of z with respect to r is negative for r > ^ rp. Since
z is positive for r = ^ rp (PD achieves the ￿rst-best solution) and negative
for r = ~ rp (under both job designs relational contracts are not available),
there must be a cut-o⁄ ￿ r, with ^ rp < ￿ r < ~ rp, at which the optimal job design
changes. This proves part (iii) of proposition 2.
Proof of proposition 3:
The proof of part (i) is again obvious and so omitted. The proof of
30part (ii) is obvious except for the range of parameter values, where ^ rp <
r ￿ ~ rc. In this case, both job designs lead to a mixture of formal and
relational contracting. Hence, condition E￿CDS;r > E￿PD;r is equivalent
to
h
(E [￿2] ￿ 1)(1 + 4rcE [￿2]) ￿ 4r2c2 (E [￿2])
2i
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order to show that PD will perform better than CDS, if ^ rp < r ￿ ~ rc,
it su¢ ces to show that the right null r2 is smaller than ^ rp. The right
null will be smaller than ^ rp; if and only if ￿3E [￿2] + 2(E [￿2])
2 + 1 +
q
￿3E [￿2] + 2(E [￿2])
2 + 1 < 2(E [￿2])
2 ￿ E [￿2]. Rearranging this con-
dition leads to 2(E [￿2])
2 ￿E [￿2] > 0, which is always ful￿lled. Hence, part
(ii) of proposition 3 is proved.
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